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Muslim youth scenes that have emerged in the past years in Germany are not a 
phenomenon of migration, but rather an integrated part of local developments 
of youth culture. Young Muslims increasingly tend to identify as Muslim and 
as German, and consider themselves as active part of German society. This 
tendency is reflected in the diversity of youth cultural scenes and actors in 
which young Muslim are engaged.  
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       few years ago, the German journalist Julia Gerlach directed attention to the 
phenomenon termed ’pop-Islamic’ youth culture. In her widely read book Be-
tween Pop and Jihad: Muslim Youth in Germany, she described a youth cul-
tural current whose origin can be traced back to the 1990s but which gained im-
portance following the attacks on 11 September 2001 and the discursive shifts in 
its aftermath.1
Muslim youth cultures - a phenomenon of migration? 
 Gerlach identified as a key characteristic of "Pop-Muslims" their 
self-conception defined by a rupture with passed-down identities and life-
scripts of their parents and grandparents. Today, these youngsters and young 
adults consider an Islamic identity, a sense of belonging to the German society 
and a modern lifestyle as consistent and unambiguous. This article places the 
emergence of this current in the wider context of Muslim youth cultures in 
Germany. 
Within the last few years, several Muslim associations and initiatives were formed that stress their belonging to German society, while at the time insisting in one form or another on their Muslim faith. Recent social research has outlined various concepts of identity, which can be observed as ideal types among the 1.6 to 1.8 mil-lion Muslims below 25 years of age in Germany.2 The boundaries between these ideal types are dynamic, and provide orientation rather than clear-cut differentia-tions. Michael Kiefer distinguishes, for example, between (1) non-religious or less 
religious, (2) fundamentalist, i.e. closely oriented towards traditional-religious 
norms, (3) nationalist-Islamic, and (4) activist-Muslim youth.3 It is important to 
note that in most cases, Islam is but one facet of identity, which forms the Leben-
swelt of these adolescents. It provides, similar to a possible immigration back-
ground of their parents and grandparents, points of contact for influences out of 
social and ideological contexts that differ from the non-Muslim majority. Fac-
tors of influence are the family context and the use and consumption of media 
from their countries of origin, which are reflected in the everyday lives of 
young Muslims.4
A
 However, it is not given that either a primary self-conception 
as Muslim or a possible identification as Arab, Turk or Albanian result in orien-
tations and lifestyles which differ from those of the majority society in a fun-
damental way. Social status, educational background and gender are equally 
important factors in terms of impact on the adolescence of young Muslims. 
Goetz Nordbruch: Muslim Youth Cultures in Germany 
 
 
3 
Moreover, young Muslims share a socialization in German society with their 
non-Muslim peers, often reflected in ‘hybrid identities’ in which ‘German-ness’, 
ethnic origin and religion are merged together as complementary aspects of 
one's own identity.5
Secularization, tradition and new religiosity 
 In this respect, Muslim youth scenes that have emerged in 
the past years are not a phenomenon of migration, but rather an integrated part 
of local developments of youth culture. 
The importance of Islam in the everyday lives of young Muslims has been the 
subject of numerous studies conducted among Muslims in Germany in recent 
years. Here, differences, which characterize the diverse Lebenswelten of young 
Muslims, become apparent. The representative study Muslims in Germany 
pointed to the large differences among Muslim pupils in regards to individual 
religious practices; for example, with regard to the frequency of praying or the 
visits of mosques.6 Yet religion plays an important role among young Mus-
lims.7 There are certainly generational differences, for example, how religious 
Muslims express their religiosity in everyday life; young Muslims which were 
raised in Germany do not necessarily share the same orientations and traditions 
with which their parents or grandparents in Turkey and Lebanon have grown 
up. Furthermore, differences that appear between the different denominations 
and language groups have to be taken into consideration.8
Different to the countries of origin of their parents’ and grandparents’ gen-
erations, in which the membership of the Muslim community was often taken 
for granted, young Muslims in the setting of non-Muslim German society often 
express a desire to manifest their religious identity and affiliation to the Muslim 
community through rituals and symbols; rituals as fasting, prayer or wearing 
the headscarf thus become part of identity politics. The strict following of Is-
lamic dietary laws, for instance, entails a clear message towards to the envi-
ronment as it serves as identification with the Muslim community, and as a 
marker of difference to non-Muslims.
 
9
The phenomenon of ‘reborn Muslims’ or ‘neo-Muslims’ is also linked to this 
context. The term designates Muslim adolescents who were not necessarily re-
ligiously educated by their parents, but developed a strong affiliation to Islam 
during their adolescence.
 
10 The strict orientation along religious values and 
norms symbolizes a biographical rupture through which a new phase of life is 
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introduced. For some of these young Muslims, this newly discovered religiosity 
represents a turning away from a lifestyle that was characterized by alcohol and 
drug abuse, promiscuity or even crime. The set of rules and unambiguous 
guidelines provide orientation and a sense of community and belonging. 
The will to distance themselves from their parents and family might be an-
other reason to turn towards religion. The religious practice of the parents’ gen-
erations, which are often associated with traditional understandings of gender 
roles, appears to many young Muslims in Germany as inappropriate. The 
commitment with ostentation to Islam opens especially for young religious 
Muslim women the opportunity to challenge patriarchal traditions. They argue 
vis-à-vis their familial context that Islam gives them the right to education and 
to pursue a profession. Conscientious wearing of a headscarf and assertive ori-
entation along religious guidelines might serve as means to claim rights and 
freedoms from their parents and brothers. In doing so, young women are able 
to claim a standing as pious Muslim women – a standing that is often valued 
higher in the socio-religious hierarchy than that of non-religious women. 
Religion and belonging 
Vis-à-vis non-Muslim society, young Muslims often insists on their right to live 
and express their religion according to their own orientation. In the light of dis-
criminatory experiences in school and at work and confronted with anti-
Muslim reservations in everyday life, the demonstrative commitment to Islam 
can also be interpreted as a self-confident response to social experiences. The 
fight against anti-Muslim racism that is often perceived as 'Islamophobia' and 
thus as directed against their own religious identity is reflected in the commit-
ment to Islam.11
Such explicit retreat to a distinct religious community contains conflict po-
tential. The study Muslims in Germany, published in the summer of 2007, docu-
ments the spread of reservations among young Muslims toward non-Muslim 
majority society.
 Racially motivated crimes such as the murder of the Egyptian 
Muslim Marwa El-Sherbini in July 2009 in Dresden serve as a cause to unite as 
Muslims and to seek the community of believers. 
12 Examples for other problematic phenomenon related to the 
retreat to the umma are the popularity of often very rigid notions of gender dif-
ferences, and the rejection of alternative sexual orientations as inconsistent with 
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Islamic traditions. The defamation of homosexuality as un-Islamic or the insis-
tence on gender segregation in high schools and free time activities are expres-
sions of such attitudes that are shared by many young Muslims. Strikingly, 
however, are again the similarities between the attitudes of young Muslims and 
non-Muslims. The respective educational background plays an important role 
in this context, as does social and economic status.13
Yet, precise and at once general statements about Muslims' sense of belong-
ing are difficult to make. 59% of Muslims in Germany stated in a Gallup poll 
that they feel ‘extremely' or 'very strongly' attached to their own community of 
faith, while only 40% expressed a similar attachment to Germany. Compared to 
the total population, however, this number is considerably high; only 32% of 
the general public identify as clearly with Germany. In this respect, the identifi-
cation with Germany is more distinct among Muslims than in the population as 
a whole. This is also reflected in the trust that is put in state institutions. While 
73% of German Muslims trust the courts, only 49% of the total population ex-
presses a similar attitude; 61% of Muslims have confidence in the German gov-
ernment, while only 36% of the total population share such confidence.
 
14
Young Muslims as social actors 
 
Young Muslims who practice their religion explicitly and self-confidently play 
an important role in rendering Islam in Germany more visible. Often it is these 
young Muslims who seek contact to the public. The desire to establish Islam as 
an integral part of the German society is at the centre of their activism. 
Associations as the Muslimische Jugend in Deutschland (MJD) [Muslim 
Youth in Germany], Lifemakers or Lichtjugend [Light youth], who often coop-
erate with non-Muslim actors, have established themselves in many cities as 
alternatives to traditional mosque associations and the large Islamic organiza-
tions. It is not so much the size of the membership that accounts for the impor-
tance of these initiatives. Only a small minority of the 3.8 to 4.3 million Muslims 
that live in Germany contributes to the activities of these associations. But with 
their public relations work, which is often addressed at Muslims and non-
Muslims, they reach an audience that goes far beyond the circle of their active 
membership. 
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This has been recognized by the traditional Islamic organizations, who aim at 
preserving their influence on the interpretation of Islamic teaching and reli-
gious practices. Federal associations such as the Zentralrat der Muslime in 
Deutschland [Central Council of Muslims in Germany], (ZMD) or the 
Islamische Gemeinschaft Milli Görüs [Islamic Community of Milli Görüs], 
(IGMG) have in recent years intensified their efforts to give themselves a more 
modern appearance in order to attract young Muslims of the second and third 
generations. The ZMD has set up multimedia projects such as the online portal 
Waymo.de and the online-TV channel Sogesehen.tv in order to target younger 
Muslims.  
The commitment of groups like Muslimische Jugend in Deutschland or of 
initiatives such as the Arbeitskreis Grüne MuslimInnen [Working Group Green 
Muslims] von Bündnis90/Die Grünen [Green Party] in the federal state of 
Nordrhine-Westphalia are indicators that the identification of young Muslims 
with Germany is increasingly accompanied with the interest to engage in poli-
tics and in society as German Muslims. This was reflected most recently during 
the campaigns for the European and national elections, when Islamic associa-
tions campaigned among Muslims to participate more actively in political deci-
sion-making processes. 
Young Muslims play a leading role in these endeavours. Initiatives in the 
voluntary sector, as such of the Lifemakers, first surfaced a decade ago. They 
distinguish themselves as social actors with campaigns to support the homeless, 
religious consultancy in prisons or in the health sector – often directing their 
activities to both Muslim and non-Muslim segments of society. In some ways, 
these initiatives resemble those of Christian currents and organizations. Not 
coincidentally, these initiatives often see themselves as a counterpart to the Boy 
Scouts or Christian organizations that combine a religious lifestyle with a ser-
vice to society. 
Muslim youth cultures 
Notwithstanding the growing influence of these initiatives, traditional Islamic 
associations continue to play an important role among young Muslims. The 
IGMG, for instance, dedicates particular attention to youth work. For this or-
ganization, educational activities to create ‘good Muslims’ and to strengthen the 
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youths’ Islamic identity are considered preconditions for a successful integra-
tion of Muslims into the German social fabric.15
However, even within organizations such as the IGMG, a generational shift 
can be observed. This shift is reflected in a critique of the well-established or-
ganizational structures and ideological approaches of these associations. 
Among younger members of the IGMG, for instance, there are indications of a 
profound re-orientation, stressing a belonging to German society and distanc-
ing themselves from the Turkish-dominated founding generation.
 By providing religious teach-
ing, homework assistance, and free time activities, the IGMG offers young Mus-
lims manifold opportunities to spend their spare time in accordance with tradi-
tional Islamic lifestyles. 
16
This tendency echoes the self-conception of ‘pop-Islamic’ groupings and ini-
tiatives. Here too, the desire for a self-conscious debate around questions of re-
ligion and identity is of central importance. Despite the relations, which are 
maintained by clubs and initiatives such as MJD with established associations 
like the Islamische Gemeinschaft in Deutschland (IGD), they emphasize a commit-
ment to find their own answers to religious questions in the everyday life of 
young Muslims.  
 
In this regard, the adoption of modern trends of youth culture implies a rap-
prochement to the non-Islamic surrounding. The popularity of lifestyle labels 
such as Style Islam, which distribute fashionable street wear and accessories 
with Islamic messages, points to the similarities these youngsters share with 
their non-Muslim peers. The range of products of such Islamic lifestyle labels 
does not incidentally include hoodies, mouse pads and coffee mugs for the of-
fice. The attraction of this Islamic lifestyle is further boosted through the use of 
new media. Online communities like myumma.de base their web presence on 
those trends and complement the range of non-religious social networks as 
Facebook and StudiVZ. Often young Muslims use both religious and non-
religious media. 
The fuzziness of the term ‘pop-Islam' becomes particularly apparent at the 
margins of this cultural spectrum. Developments that are familiar from the 
U.S.-American and British contexts begin to emerge in Germany as well. On the 
one hand, Islamic youth cultures become increasingly open to mainstream 
youth cultures, which is observable for instance in the success of the US-Islamic 
punk band The Kominas or the Danish hip-hop band Outlandish.17 On the other 
hand, the popularity of websites such as Muslimhiphop.net indicates the take-
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over of pop-cultural elements by radical Islamist movements and groups. The 
Islamist grouping Hizb ut-Tahrir, as for one example, combines modern lifestyle 
with explicitly Islamist messages. 
Despite the popularity of this broadly labelled ‘pop-Islamic’ current, the 
Internet is dominated by another current that is committed to an offensive 
promotion for a rigid interpretation of Islam. Websites like einladungzumpara-
dies.de [“invitation to paradise”] or diewahrheitimherzen.de [”the truth in the 
heart”] maintained by this current offer information about Islam and devoted 
life. The Salafist current of Islam, to which these initiatives belong, claims to 
follow the example of the Salaf, the first generation of Muslims, while rejecting 
any “innovations” to the original teachings of the Qur’an and the Sunna.18
The attractiveness of well-defined communities becomes also evident in the 
popularity of youth cultures in which ethnic identity is emphasized besides Is-
lam. For one, the Turkish-Islamic group Bozkurtlar [“The Grey Wolves”] in re-
cent years gained in popularity among Turkish-speaking youth. The linkage of 
an authoritarian Turkish nationalism with Islamist conceptions of society offers 
an orientation in which the status of one’s own ethnic and religious identity is 
enhanced vis-à-vis the surrounding social environment. Similar processes of 
self-ethnicizing can be observed among youth with Albanian, Lebanese or Pal-
estinian family background. Such reference to a supposedly authentic ethnic 
identity is often related to a gain in status in the adolescents’ everyday life.
 Both 
in appearance, often characterized by the traditional Arabic dress, beards, and 
sometimes even niqab, and in contents of religious instruction, the followers of 
this current distinguish themselves from associations such as MJD. Yet, through 
the appearance of their often very charismatic preachers and the organization of 
public lectures and so-called Islamic seminars in many cities, they have gained 
a considerable following. What is striking is the ambivalent relationship of 
these groupings to the non-Islamic context. While proponents of this strand 
generally emphasize their belonging to German society, simultaneously they 
define themselves as outsiders, which represent the right path in an infidel en-
vironment. The life of the prophet Muhammad is considered here as an exam-
ple for Muslims living in Germany. After all, Muhammad was initially opposed 
as a ‘stranger’ before he was able to prevail with his message vis-à-vis his ad-
versaries. Therefore, the experience of racist hostilities only appears to affirm 
the withdrawal to the community of Muslims. 
19 
This orientation is reflected in the symbolic expression of this identity in daily 
life. The displays of national symbols and the often aggressive commitment as 
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"Albanians" or "Lebanese" through self-composed music and music videos are 
different forms of expression of this phenomenon. 
The variety of options from which young Muslims can choose could be in-
terpreted as an indication for an increasing ‘naturalization’ of Islam in Ger-
many. Notwithstanding the distinctive features, which characterize the indi-
vidual currents, there are several parallels and links to trends and styles of non-
Islamic youth cultures. As such, these youth cultures – and the increasingly 
multifaceted phenomenon of Pop-Islam among them – are part and parcel of 
the German social fabric.  
* A short version of this article was published in Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte 
(27/2010). Suheir Sharqas provided the English translation of this article.  
 
                                                          
1 Julia Gerlach, Zwischen Pop und Dschihad. Muslimische Jugendliche in Deutschland [Between 
Pop and Jihad. Muslim Youth in Germany], Berlin 2006. 
2 Sonja Haug/Stephanie Müssig/Anja Stichs, Muslimisches Leben in Deutschland. Im Auftrag der 
Deutschen Islam Konferenz [Muslim Life in Germany. On behalf of the German Islam Conference], 
Nuremberg 2009, p. 105. 
3 Michael Kiefer, „Lebenswelten muslimischer Jugendlicher – eine Typologie von Identität-
sentwürfen“ [‘Lebenswelten of Muslim youth – a typology of identity frameworks‘], in Harry 
Harun Behr/Hansjörg Schmid/Mathias Rohe (eds.), Was soll ich hier? Lebensweltorientierung 
muslimischer Schülerinnen und Schüler als Herausforderung für den Islamischen Religion-
sunterricht [What am I here for? Orientations of Lebenswelten among Muslim High School Students 
as Challenge to Islamic Religious Education], Berlin 2010. ‘Fundamentalist’ is here not to be unders-
tood in the sense of Islamist, i.e. an orientation that aims to Islamicize the society, but rather as a 
traditionalist-influenced adherence to religious norms and values. A different typology is pre-
sented by Hans-Jürgen von Wensierski and Claudia Lübcke in „Hip-Hop, Kopftuch und Fami-
lie – Jugendphase und Jugendkulturen junger Muslime in Deutschland“ [‘Hip-Hop, Headscarf 
and Family – Adolescence and youth cultures of young Muslims in Germany’] in Christine 
Hunner-Kreisel/Sabine Andresen (Hrsg.), Kindheit und Jugend in muslimischen Lebenswelten, 
Wiesbaden 2010, p. 158. 
4 Dirk Halm, ‘Freizeit, Medien und kulturelle Orientierung junger Türkeistämmiger in Deut-
schland’ [‘Leisure time, media and cultural orientation among adolescents of Turkish origin in 
Germany’], in Hans-Jürgen von Wensierski/Claudia Lübcke (Hrsg.) Junge Muslime in Deut-
Goetz Nordbruch: Muslim Youth Cultures in Germany 
 
 
10 
                                                                                                                                                                          
schland. Lebenslagen, Aufwachsprozesse und Jugendkulturen [Young Muslims in Germany: Circums-
tances, Processes of Growing-Up and Youth Cultures], Opladen 2007, pp. 108-110. 
5 Naika Foroutan/Isabel Schäfer, „Hybride Identitäten - muslimische Migrantinnen und Migran-
ten in Deutschland und Europa“ [‘Hybrid identities: Muslim migrants in Germany and 
Europe‘], Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte (5/2009), pp. 11-12. 
6 Katrin Brettfeld/Peter Wetzels, Muslime in Deutschland: Integration, Integrationsbarrieren, Relig-
ion und Einstellungen zu Demokratie, Rechtsstaat und politisch-religiös motivierter Gewalt [Muslims in 
Germany: Integration, Obstacles to Integration, Religion and Attitudes towards Democracy, Rule of Law 
and Politically and Religiously Motivated Violence], Berlin 2007, p. 243. 
7 Michael Blume, „Islamische Religiosität nach Altersgruppen“ [‘Islamic religiosity according to 
age groups‘], in Bertelsmann-Stiftung (ed.), Religionsmonitor 2008. Muslimische Religiosität in 
Deutschland [Monitor of Religion 2008: Muslim Religiosity in Germany], Gütersloh 2008, p. 44. 
8 Jörn Thielmann, „Vielfältige muslimische Religiosität in Deutschland“ [‘Muslim religiosity in 
Germany‘], in Bertelsmann-Stiftung, Religionsmonitor 2008, p. 16. 
9 Blume, ibid., p. 45. 
10 Cf. Sigrid Nökel, „’Neo-Muslimas’ – Alltags- und Geschlechterpolitiken junger muslimischer 
Frauen zwischen Religion, Tradition und Moderne“ [‘Neo-Muslimas‘: Everyday and gender 
politics of young Muslim women between religion, tradition and modernity], in von Wensier-
ski/Lübcke, Junge Muslime in Deutschland, pp. 135-154. 
11 See Brettfeld/Wetzels, ibid., pp. 236-242, for an example of discriminatory perceptions among 
Muslims. 
12 Ibid., p. 336 and 340. 
13 For the relationship between religiosity and homophobia among young migrants, cf. to Bernd 
Simon, "Einstellungen zur Homosexualität: Ausprägungen und psychologische Korrelate bei 
Jugendlichen mit und ohne Migrationshintergrund (ehemalige UdSSR und Türkei)" [Attitudes 
towards homosexuality: Characteristics and psychological correlates among youth with and 
without backgrounds of migration (former Soviet Union and Turkey], Zeitschrift für Entwick-
lungspsychologie und Pädagogische Psychologie, 40/2008, p. 98. 
14 The Gallup Coexist Index 2009: A Global Study of Interfaith Relations, p. 19 and 23. 
15 „’Großer Bruder, kleiner Bruder’: Islamische Identität in der Kinder- und Jugendarbeit von 
Milli Görüs“ [‘‘Big brother, small brother‘: Islamic identity in children and youth work of Milli 
Görüs‘], Newsletter „Jugendkultur, Religion und Demokratie. Politische Bildung mit jungen Musli-
Goetz Nordbruch: Muslim Youth Cultures in Germany 
 
 
11 
                                                                                                                                                                          
men“ [Newsletter "Youth Culture, Religion and Democracy. Civic education with young Mus-
lims"], No. 11/2009, pp. 5-7. 
16 On developments within the IGMG, cf. to Werner Schiffauer, After Islamism: An Ethnogra-
phy of the Islamic Community Milli Görüs, Berlin 2010. However, the significance of this gen-
erational change is disputed among observers of IGMG, cf. to Eberhard Seidel, ‘Der Ethnologe 
und seine Boygroup‘ [The anthropologist and his boy group‘], Die Tageszeitung, 3 April 2010. 
The German intelligence agencies doubt a fundamental re-orientation of IGMG. 
17 See the novel of Michael Muhamad Knight, The Taqwacores, New York 2004, and to Mark 
LeVine, Heavy Metal Islam. Rock, Resistance, and the Struggle for the Soul of Islam, New York 2008. 
18 On the influence of salafism on the internet, see Ekkehard Rudolph, ‘Salafistische Propagan-
da im Internet. Eine Analyse von Argumentationsmustern im Spannungsfeld von missionaris-
chem Aktivismus, Islamismus und Gewaltlegitimation‘ [‘Salafist propaganda on the internet: an 
analysis of patterns of argumentation in the zone of tension between missionary activism, Is-
lamism and legitimation of violence’], in Armin Pfahl-Traughber (ed.), Jahrbuch für Extremismus- 
und Terrorismus-Forschung 2009/2010 [Yearbook of Extremism and Terrorism Research on 2009/2010], 
Brühl 2010, pp. 486-501. 
19 Cf. Kemal Bozay, "... ich bin stolz, Türke zu sein!" Ethnisierung gesellschaftlicher Konflikte im Zei-
chen der Globalisierung [‘I am proud to be a Turk!‘ Ethnicization of Social Conflicts in the Age of Global-
ization], Schwalbach/Ts. 2005, and Schule ohne Rassismus – Schule mit Courage (ed.), Rechtsex-
tremismus in der Einwanderungsgesellschaft. Ex-Jugoslawen. Russlanddeutsche, Türken und Polen 
[Right-wing Extremism in the Immigration Society: Former-Yugoslavs, Russian Germans, Turks, and 
Poles], Berlin 2010. 
